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PRECAP; Matter of J.S.: Defining the Standard for Ineffective 
Counsel in Involuntary Commitment Proceedings 
 
Tori Nickol 
 
Oral argument is set for Wednesday, June 28, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., 
in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek 
Justice Building, Helena, Montana. 
 
I.   Questions Presented 
 
Did appointed counsel provide ineffective assistance during 
Appellant’s involuntary commitment proceedings?1 
Should the standards for assessing the effectiveness of the 
assistance provided by a respondent’s legal counsel in an involuntary 
commitment proceeding, adopted in In re Mental Health of K.G.F., be 
revisited and revised?2 
 
This question is of particular importance because the standard for 
effective counsel articulated in K.G.F. is a more stringent standard than 
the Court applies to appointed counsel in criminal proceedings; these strict 
requirements, coupled with the tight statutory time constraints in 
involuntary commitment proceedings, make it difficult for appointed 
counsel to satisfy the requirements for both effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
II.   Introduction 
 
 Appellant J.S. was found to be suffering a mental disorder which 
prevented her from properly caring for her infected wounds. She was 
involuntarily committed to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), following 
a hearing in which J.S. was represented by a public defender.3 The District 
Court committed J.S. to the custody of MSH for a period not to exceed 90 
days.4 
 On appeal, J.S. argues that her appointed counsel failed to 
effectively represent her because her counsel did not satisfy the five 
standards of representation that Montana uses to evaluate effectiveness of 
counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings.5 J.S. asserts that the five-
part test articulated in In re Mental Health K.G.F.6, establishes a strict 
standard for effective counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings and 
maintains that her appointed counsel failed to satisfy any of the  five of the 
criteria.7 However, the State argues that the five-part test from K.G.F. is 
                                                          
1 Opening Brief of Appellant, Matter of J.S., https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-
0156%20Appellant's%20Opening%20--%20Brief?id={80641E59-0000-CD16-BD6F-
322238874015} (Mont. Dec. 20, 2016) (No. DA 16-0156). 
2 Order, Montana State Supreme Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-
0156%20Classified%20-%20Oral%20Argument%20--%20Order?id={20C11D5C-0000-CC13-
BDC9-4A8C37102CE4}, (May 18, 2017) (No. DA 16-0156). 
3 Reply Brief of Appellee, Matter of J.S., 2017 WL1158316 at *1 (Mont. Mar. 10, 2017) (No. DA 
16-0156). 
4 Id. 
5 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 13. 
6 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001). 
7 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 13. 
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unnecessary, and the Court should consider replacing the five-part test 
with the broadly used Strickland v. Washington8 standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.9 Ultimately, J.S. argues that her order for committal 
should be vacated, or the Court should remand for a hearing into her 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.10 
 
III.   Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 At the end of January 2016, J.S. was struck by a car on the 
outskirts of Helena and was brought into the Emergency Room (ER) at St. 
Peter’s Hospital to treat her cuts and abrasions.11 The physician treating 
J.S. observed that J.S. appeared delusional and detached, so Kim Waples, 
a mental health professional, completed a mental health evaluation of 
J.S..12 Waples asked the State to place J.S. on emergency detention at 
MSH, and J.S. was then sent to MSH.13 The State subsequently filed a 
commitment petition, but J.S. was discharged a few days later by a 
different mental health professional. The commitment petition was 
dismissed.14 
 On February 9, 2016, J.S. called 911 and asked to be taken to the 
Center for Mental Health (Center). The Center was unable to immediately 
treat J.S., so at the request of a police officer J.S. was taken back to the 
ER.15 ER staff treated J.S. for an infection in her leg, resulting from a lack 
of proper care for her previous injury, and observed she was delusional 
and agitated.16 A mental health professional evaluated J.S., who was then 
detained at Journey Home, a local mental health center, on an emergency 
basis.17 The State filed a petition for involuntary commitment18 on 
February 10, 2016, and the court held an initial appearance on the petition 
that same day.19 At the initial appearance, J.S. appeared by VisionNet from 
Journey Home with attorney Suzanne Seburn, whom she had been 
appointed by the Office of the Public Defender.20 The court advised J.S. 
of her rights, appointed Waples as the mental health professional to 
examine J.S., and scheduled the hearing for the next day.21 Journey Home, 
concerned about J.S.’s medical needs, had asked that the hearing be “fast 
tracked.”22 
 On the morning of February 11, Waples examined J.S. at Journey 
                                                          
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
9 Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *15. 
10 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 14. 
11 Id. at 3. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 3–4.  
15 Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *29. 
16 Id. at *1. 
17 Id. at *2. 
18 To be involuntarily committed, the court considers four factors: 1) whether, because of a mental 
illness, the person cannot provide for his or her basic needs; 2) whether, because of a mental illness, 
the respondent has recently caused injury to himself or others; 3) whether, because of a mental 
disorder, the respondent is an imminent threat to himself or others; 4) whether, if untreated, the 
respondent’s mental disorder will deteriorate and the respondent will likely become a threat to 
himself or others. MONT. CODE ANN. § 51–21–126(1). 
19 Reply brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *2. 
20 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 1. 
21 Id. at 1-2. 
22 Id. at 1. 
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Home and filed a report with the court, recommending J.S. be committed 
to MSH with the ability for MSH to administer involuntary medications.23 
The State called Waples as a witness at the hearing later that day, and also 
called Justin Kennedy, a registered nurse at Journey Home with training 
in wound care.24 J.S. appeared at the hearing with attorney Melissa 
Edwards, another public defender.25 Edwards had been present for J.S.’s 
evaluation, but she did not call any witnesses, including J.S.26  
 Waples testified that J.S. has bipolar disorder and that she had 
previously treated J.S. at the ER for psychosis and delusion.27 Waples 
testified to other events in J.S.’s records, including events for which she 
was not the treating mental health professional.28 Waples described the 
interaction with J.S. and the police officer at the Center, but Edwards 
objected to that testimony as hearsay and the court sustained the 
objection.29 At one point during Waples’ testimony, J.S. interrupted, 
claiming to be an attorney and a cop; the court intervened and told J.S. that 
it would “hear whatever you have to say later.”30 Waples continued to 
testify that if J.S. were not committed, she would be unable to care for 
herself or her infection.31 Waples recounted that when she had asked J.S. 
if she understood what kind of care her injury required, J.S. “didn’t 
respond. She just kind of shrugged.”32 J.S. again attempted to interrupt the 
testimony, but Waples reiterated that J.S. did not respond or indicate that 
she knew how to care for her wound.33 
 Edwards cross-examined Waples and established that J.S. was 
capable of seeking treatment, which J.S. had demonstrated by calling 911 
and going to the Center and the ER.34 On redirect, Waples recommended 
J.S. be committed at MSH because she was an imminent threat of harm to 
herself; Waples testified that MSH was J.S.’s only option because she 
would not voluntarily stay at a community placement like Journey 
Home.35 
 The State’s other witness, Kennedy, testified that J.S.’s confusion 
and lack of access to medical care would contribute to her wound 
worsening and put her at risk for future infections.36 Kennedy testified that 
J.S. initially seemed “very receptive” to his instructions about wound care, 
but could not recall that information five minutes later.37 In response to 
Edward’s questioning during cross examination, Kennedy admitted that 
homelessness, rather than mental health issues, could cause a person to fail 
to obtain medical care.38 Kennedy clarified that, in J.S.’s case, her failure 
to obtain care was due to mental health problems, not her homelessness, 
                                                          
23 Id. at 2.  
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *5. 
28 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3. 
29 Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *5. 
30 Id. at *6.  
31 Id. at *7. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34Id. at *8. 
35 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 7. 
36 Id. at 5. 
37 Id. 
38 Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at *4.  
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and that in his opinion J.S. would be incapable of changing her wound 
dressings and taking her antibiotics by herself.39 
 Following testimony, the State argued that J.S.’s mental illness put 
her in imminent danger, and that she was unable to care for herself.40 The 
State argued that MSH was the least restrictive solution, and J.S.’s only 
option, as she could not be involuntarily committed to a community 
setting.41 In response, Edwards argued that the court should dismiss the 
petition, but she also argued that MSH was not the least restrictive 
alternative, and J.S. had other options.42 Edwards argued that the State 
could contact Journey Home to see if it would accept J.S. on a diversion 
status, or that the court could order a community commitment if it found 
J.S. required commitment solely because of the probability that her 
condition would cause her future harm, per § 53–21–126(1)(d) Mont. 
Code Ann.43  
 While Edwards continued her argument, Waples contacted 
Journey Home and asked if it would accept J.S. on a diversion 
commitment—it would not.44 At the court’s request, Waples returned to 
testify and explained that Journey Home refused to accept J.S. under the 
diversion statute because J.S. had been extremely disruptive while there: 
she had thrown food, taken off her bandages, and had attempted to injure 
another resident.45 Edwards did not immediately object to this testimony, 
but made a hearsay objection after the court voiced its concern that J.S. 
refused to keep her bandage on.46 The court overruled the objection on the 
grounds that the information was in Waples’ report and she could rely on 
it as an expert.47 
 During the time when Waples was contacting Journey Home, 
Edwards had continued her arguments, explaining the court’s other option 
to commit J.S. to a community treatment center. Edwards argued that the 
sole provision of § 53-21-126(1)(d) allowed the court to order J.S. to seek 
community treatment, if the court found that J.S. had a mental disorder 
which would deteriorate and negatively affect her ability to care for 
herself.48 Edwards made no suggestions as to where J.S. could go, and 
admitted she did not know if Journey Home would accept J.S.49 Edwards 
also did not request a continuance of the hearing to investigate alternatives 
to the MSH for J.S.50  
 The court ordered J.S. to be committed to the MSH for up to 90 
days with a provision that allowed MSH to involuntarily medicate J.S.51 
In the court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court did not 
make any findings relying on Waples’ testimony regarding J.S.’s behavior 
at Journey Home.52 The court summarized J.S.’s background and 
                                                          
39 Id. at *3. 
40 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 8. 
41  Id. 
42 Id. at 9. 
43 Id. 
44 Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *11. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at *11–12. 
48 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 10. 
49 Id. at 11. 
50 Id. 
51 Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 12. 
52 Id. 
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testimony concerning her mental health history, and ultimately lamented 
the lack of options available to those suffering from mental health issues.53 
 
IV.   Summary of the Arguments 
 
A.   Appellant J.S. 
 
1. Edwards did not effectively represent J.S. because Edwards failed 
every criterion established in K.G.F., and the Court should consequently 
dismiss the order for involuntary commitment. 
 
 J.S. argues that, under the Court’s holding in K.G.F., Edwards did 
not provide effective and competent representation to J.S. during her 
involuntary commitment hearing.54 In K.G.F., the Court rejected applying 
the Strickland standard55 (deficient performance and prejudice) 
determining the effectiveness of counsel in an involuntary commitment 
proceeding, and instead established five areas of representation a 
respondent is entitled to in an involuntary commitment hearing.56 The 
Court analyzes the following factors to measure effective assistance of 
counsel: 1) appointment of competent counsel; 2) counsel’s initial 
investigation; 3) counsel’s interview with the client; 4) the patient-
respondent’s right to remain silent; and 5) counsel’s role as advocate and 
adversary.57 J.S. argues that Edwards failed to adequately represent J.S. in 
any of the five categories required by K.G.F, but particularly emphasizes 
that Edwards misrepresented Montana law and that she failed to 
adequately investigate and interview with J.S..58 
 J.S. argues that she was not appointed competent counsel because 
Edwards mistakenly argued that community commitment was only 
available under § 53–21–126(1)(d) and because Edwards did not possess 
requisite understanding of J.S.’s other options.59 According to J.S., the 
record shows that the District Court favored a community commitment, 
but Edwards mistakenly informed the court that it could only order a 
community commitment if it based its order on a belief that J.S.’s mental 
disorder would deteriorate and inevitably cause her future harm.60 J.S. 
argues that community commitments are not limited only to instances that 
satisfy (1)(d) and that community commitments can apply to any of the 
criteria in § 53–21–126.61 Because Edwards incorrectly interpreted the 
statute, J.S. argues she was denied the opportunity for the court to consider 
a less restrictive placement than MSH.62 Furthermore, J.S. did not receive 
Edwards’ name and qualifications before the hearing, which J.S. argues 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 14.  
55 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In a criminal proceeding, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel must show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s performance. 
56 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 14, citing In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 
(Mont. 2001).  
57 Id. at 15.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 15-16. 
61 Id. at 18. 
62 Appellant’s Reply Brief, Matter of J.S., 2016 WL 1390996 at *2 (Apr. 13, 2017) (No. DA 16-
0156). 
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prevented her from exercising her right to verify competent counsel.63 J.S. 
also rejects the State’s argument that Edwards was competent based on her 
previous training in involuntary commitments, because this information 
was obtained from sources outside the record.64 
 Second, J.S. argues that counsel’s initial investigation was 
inadequate because she did not investigate records and pursue all available 
alternatives.65 J.S. asserts that the record shows Edwards did not 
adequately investigate because she was unaware that community 
commitment was an option for J.S., nor did she contact Journey Home or 
the Center to investigate whether J.S. could stay there.66 J.S. argues that 
the fact that Edwards had less than a day to conduct such an investigation 
is irrelevant.67 Because Edwards was aware of the short time frame and 
failed to investigate alternative placements or request a continuance to do 
so, J.S. argues that Edwards ineffectively represented her during the initial 
investigation phase.68 
  Third, J.S. contends that under both § 53-21-121(3) and the 
directives of K.G.F., Edwards failed to satisfy the criteria for the counsel’s 
interview with the client, because she did not “meet with the respondent, 
explain the substance of the petition, and explain the probable course of 
the proceedings.”69 J.S. emphasizes that a client interview should happen 
before the involuntary commitment proceeding, and counsel should 
request a continuation of the hearing if it is not possible to accomplish the 
interview in the given time frame.70 Because J.S. appeared with a different 
attorney at her initial appearance, J.S. argues that she did not have an 
adequate interview with Edwards when Edwards became her counsel.71 In 
addition, J.S. argues that her interruptions indicate that she wanted to 
testify, that the judge’s response about the value of her testimony indicated 
that she would testify, and that Edwards’ failure to call J.S. as a witness 
ignored J.S.’s desire and deprived J.S. of her constitutional right to testify 
on her behalf.72 
 Fourth, J.S. argues that she had a constitutional right to remain 
silent, and her silence during Waples’ examination of her should not have 
been admissible as evidence, so Edwards failed to effectively represent her 
in this area.73 J.S. emphasizes that the right to remain silent applies to a 
professional person examination of a patient-respondent.74 During 
Waples’ testimony, she discussed her evaluation of J.S. and noted that J.S. 
did not respond to her questions; J.S. maintains that Edwards’ failure to 
object nullified the value of J.S.’s right to remain silent.75 By failing to 
object to Waples’ testimony regarding J.S.’s silence, J.S. argues that her 
due process rights were violated and Edwards failed to provide effective 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Id.at *1. 
65 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 22.  
66 Id. at 22. 
67 Id. at 23. 
68 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 23. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 24. 
71 Id. at 25.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 26. 
74 Id. (citing § 53–21–115(6) and § 53–21–123(1)). 
75 Id. at 27. 
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counsel.76 
 Finally, J.S. asserts that Edwards failed in her role as an advocate 
and adversary, because Edwards incorrectly presented Montana law, and 
did not allow J.S. to testify in her defense.77 J.S. also argues that Edwards’ 
misunderstanding of relevant Montana law demonstrated that Edwards did 
not vigorously investigate alternative placements.78 Additionally, J.S. 
argues that Edwards failed in her role as an adversary because her 
purported lack of preparation led her to invite the State to present 
questionable testimony from Waples about the possibility of J.S. staying 
at Journey Home on a diversion status.79 J.S. stresses that pursuant to 
Mont. R. Evid. 802, hearsay is generally not admissible at an involuntary 
commitment proceeding.80 Responding to the assertion that Waples is a 
health professional and allowed to testify to otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay that she relied on in forming her expert opinion, J.S. argues that 
Edwards failed to object to Waples’ testimony on the grounds that it was 
prevented as substantive evidence.81 J.S. argues that Waples’ testimony 
about her behavior at Journey Home was provided after Waples had 
testified to her opinion, so Edwards’ failure to contemporaneously object 
to that testimony as hearsay damaged J.S.’s chances of receiving a 
community commitment.82 
 
B.   Plaintiff and Appellee the State of Montana 
 
1. The Court should reconsider using Strickland to evaluate the 
effectiveness of counsel in involuntary commitment hearings and overrule 
the five-part test from K.G.F. 
 
 The State urges the court to reconsider applying the standard from 
Strickland, rather than the test articulated in K.G.F., when confronted with 
the question of effective counsel in involuntary commitment 
proceedings.83 The Strickland standard is generally applied in criminal 
proceedings, and has two parts: whether the counsel’s performance was 
deficient and whether the defendant was prejudiced as a result.84 The State 
emphasizes that Montana is the only jurisdiction that applies the five-part 
test in its evaluation of counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings, 
and most courts favor the Strickland standard.85 The State argues that 
Montana’s application of a stricter test for counsel in an involuntary 
commitment proceeding presumes that patient-respondents in such actions 
will be provided with “unreasonably low” levels of legal assistance; the 
State juxtaposes this perception with the lack of cases in which the court 
has found counsel ineffective in an involuntary commitment proceeding, 
and ultimately argues that the five-part test from K.G.F. is unnecessary.86 
                                                          
76 Id. 
77 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, 28, 29. 
78 Id. at 30. 
79 Id. at 31. 
80 Id. at 32. 
81 Appellant Reply brief, supra, at *14.  
82 Id. at *16.  
83 Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *15. 
84 Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
85 Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 3, at *15. 
86 Id. at *15–16. 
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2. Weighting the current K.G.F. standards, Edwards represented 
J.S. competently and effectively, and this Court should consequently affirm 
the order of commitment. 
 
 The State responds to each of J.S.’s arguments on the five criteria 
articulated in K.G.F. and asserts that J.S. cannot show that Edwards 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.87 The State argues that Edwards 
meets the competency requirements for assigned counsel in involuntary 
commitment proceedings because Edwards had previously led a training 
on representation in involuntary commitments.88 Additionally, while the 
State concedes that Edwards misinterpreted § 53–21–126(1)(d), the State 
argues that this mistake does not indicate that Edwards was incompetent 
about involuntary commitment actions.89 The State maintains that the 
record reflects Edwards’ competency because she demonstrated 
knowledge of the diversion statutes and effectively examined the State’s 
witnesses to show that J.S. understood some level of wound treatment.90 
Furthermore, the State contends that the Court should reject J.S.’s 
argument that she had a right to learn Edwards name and qualifications 
before the hearing, because the statutory language underlying the Court’s 
reasoning in K.G.F. has since been removed.91 
 Second, the State refutes J.S.’s argument that Edwards conducted 
an insufficient investigation.92 The State argues that Edwards did not fail 
to investigate alternatives to the MSH placement because there were no 
available alternatives.93 Edwards did not investigate the possibility of 
sending J.S. to Journey Home on a diversion status because a professional 
person must recommend diversion and Waples did not recommend it.94 
 Third, the State argues that K.G.F.’s directive that counsel should 
interview the client “sufficiently before any scheduled hearings to permit 
effective preparation and prehearing assistance to the client” is unrealistic, 
considering the fast-paced nature of involuntary commitment 
proceedings.95 According to the State, the respondent-patient in 
involuntary commitment proceedings is better served by counsel who 
adapts to the fast-paced schedule rather than counsel who delays the 
commitment hearing; delaying the commitment hearing is detrimental to 
the respondent if she ultimately does not meet the committal criteria, and 
delay could be dangerous to a respondent who is in critical need of the 
services provided by MSH.96 The State agrees that the timeframe for 
Edwards and J.S. to meet was short, but notes that there is no minimum 
amount of time that serves as the standard for effective counsel.97 The 
                                                          
87 Id. at *16. 
88 Id. 
89 Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 3, at *17. 
90 Id. at *18. 
91 Id. at *19 (noting that the statutory language requiring “that the desires of the respondent must be 
taken into consideration in the . . . confirmation of the appointment of the attorney,” has been 
removed from § 53-21-122(2) since the Court in K.G.F. relied on it as a requirement for appointing 
competent counsel). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at *21 (citing § 53–21–123(3)(b)). 
95 Id. at *22 (quoting K.G.F., ¶ 78). 
96 Id. at *22-23. 
97 Id. at *23. 
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State also rejects J.S.’s contention that her interruptions during witness 
testimony indicated a desire to testify, and that Edwards ignored or failed 
to understand that desire.98  
 Fourth, the State advocates for a different interpretation of when 
the right to remain silent attaches in an involuntary commitment 
proceeding. Quoting K.G.F., the State notes that the right to remain silent 
“potentially conflicts with § 53-21-123(1), MCA, which requires after the 
initial hearing, that the respondent must be examined by the professional 
person without unreasonable delay.”99 To remedy this conflict, the State 
suggests that the respondent’s right to remain silent applies during court 
proceedings but not during the examination.100 The right to remain silent 
in an involuntary commitment proceeding is different than the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent in a criminal proceeding; under the 
State’s argument, the respondent’s silence should be admissible as 
evidence.101 An involuntary commitment hearing, unlike a criminal 
proceeding, is designed to help a respondent access the treatment she 
needs to prevent her from harming herself or others, so the Court needs to 
be presented with the evidence that a respondent refused to speak with a 
medical professional.102 The State argues that Edwards did not object 
because information regarding J.S.’s silence was admissible.103 
 Finally, the State argues that Edwards met the “vigorous 
advocacy” requirements of K.G.F. in her role as an advocate to J.S.104 
Again, the State agrees that Edwards misrepresented the commitment 
statute in § 53-21-126(1)(d), but the State maintains that despite this 
misunderstanding, Edwards continued to advocate for a community 
commitment for J.S.105 Additionally, the State argues that Edwards’ failure 
to object to Waples’ testimony on background information was justified 
because Edwards relied on that information to form her professional 
opinion.106 The State also notes that while Edwards did not object 
contemporaneously with Waples’ testimony about J.S.’s behavior at 
Journey Home, she objected shortly thereafter.107 The State argues that 
Edwards made an effective choice to let Waples provide information about 
Journey Home’s willingness to accept J.S., because the Court expressed a 
preference for a community commitment.108 
 
V.   Analysis 
 
A. The Court is unlikely to replace the K.G.F. factors with the 
Strickland test, but it will likely reevaluate its analysis of K.G.F. or 
articulate an entirely new test. 
 
 J.S. alleges that she was ineffectively represented, but her appeal 
                                                          
98 Id. at *24. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at *25.  
101  Id. 
102 Id. at *26.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at *27. 
105 Id. at *28. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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raises broader questions about involuntary commitment procedure and 
representation. The primary issue for the Court here will be to determine 
whether the standard articulated in K.G.F remains a necessary safeguard 
for patient-respondents facing involuntary commitment, or if it imposes 
unnecessary requirements that ignore the rapid nature of involuntary 
commitment proceedings. Ultimately, J.S. asks the Court to settle the 
question: to how much due process is a patient-respondent in an 
involuntary commitment proceeding entitled? 
 If the Court finds that the K.G.F. factors continue to be the best 
measure for effectiveness of counsel in involuntary commitment 
proceedings, then the Court will reinforce that patient-respondents are 
entitled to extra due process protections that are not specifically articulated 
in the statutes governing the treatment of the severely mentally ill.109 
Furthermore, in K.G.F., the Court noted that the five criteria were 
“generally” the scope of effective counsel, but they were not the exclusive 
definition of effective counsel.110 Thus, if the Court upholds K.G.F., it 
should define, exclusively, the scope and test of effective counsel to satisfy 
due process. However, if the Court rejects the standards in K.G.F., the 
Court will then either adopt the Strickland standard or articulate a new test. 
 The Court is more likely to uphold K.G.F. than it is to embrace 
Strickland as the new standard. In K.G.F., the Court emphasized that the 
unique nature of involuntary commitment proceedings mandated vigilant 
due process protection not only by counsel, but by the courts as well.111 
Because these proceedings are distinct from criminal proceedings, the 
Court in K.G.F. rejected the Strickland standard for evaluating 
effectiveness of counsel, and the Court is unlikely to change its view.112 
The Court explains its preference for a higher standard for legal assistance 
in involuntary commitments because patient-respondents face 
deprivations of their liberty and dignity, but not necessarily because they 
committed a crime. The Court had the opportunity to reconsider the 
Strickland analysis in 2013, but the Court reiterated its preference for the 
K.G.F. five-part test because Strickland did not provide adequate due 
process protections to patient-respondents.113  
 This consequently leaves the Court with two options: reaffirm 
K.G.F. and its application to the effectiveness of counsel, or derive a new 
test based on the statutory requirements. However, the statutory 
requirements that govern the treatment of the severely mentally ill have 
not drastically changed since K.G.F., so a complete overhaul seems 
unlikely.114 Therefore, the Court seems most likely to reconsider its 
analysis of the five criteria in K.G.F., particularly counsel’s initial 
investigation and counsel’s interview with the client. 
 The Court has consistently acknowledged that the statutory time 
constraints complicate the way in which counsel approaches its 
representation in involuntary commitment proceedings.115 Both the 
counsel’s initial investigation and the counsel’s interview with the client 
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are severely limited because § 53–21–122 states that the hearing for an 
involuntary commitment must occur within five days of the initial 
appearance—an incredibly short span for counsel to review records, 
research alternative community placements, meet with the client, and 
attend the psychological examination. The Court in K.G.F. attempted to 
remedy this problem by suggesting that counsel “freely and liberally 
request a continuance prior to the hearing.”116 This suggestion, however, 
undermines the Court’s previous public policy concern of prolonging 
involuntary commitment proceedings because it will likely have a 
disruptive and detrimental effect on the client. This leaves the Court in a 
position to determine which public policy it prefers: the stringent 
requirements for the initial investigation and client interview, or a short 
involuntary commitment process that avoids disruptive and detrimental 
effects on the client. 
 
B. The Court is unlikely to find that J.S. received ineffective 
assistance of counsel, even if the Court applies the current version of 
K.G.F. 
 
 If the Court upholds K.G.F. and applies it to J.S.’s claim of 
ineffective counsel as the five-part test currently stands, it will likely find 
that Edwards was not ineffective. First, Edwards did not supply J.S. with 
her name and credentials before the hearing; although the express 
language of the statute does not require such disclosure, the Court has 
clearly established the precedent that such a disclosure is prudential, and 
this weighs against the State.117 What is most problematic for Edwards is 
that she misinterpreted the statutes governing community commitments, 
and premised her argument solely on one consideration.118  Under the 
community commitment statute, the Court may consider an involuntary 
commitment if any of the requirements in § 53–21–126(a)–(d) are met, not 
only if (d) is met, as Edwards suggested. Thus, if the District Court had 
found that J.S. was unable to care for her basic needs, or that she had 
recently injured herself or others, or that she was an imminent threat to 
herself or others, the Court could have ordered a community 
commitment.119 However, it is not clear that the court would have altered 
its decision without this mistake, and Journey Home ultimately refused to 
keep J.S. on diversion status; thus, the mistake weighs heavily against the 
State, but is not dispositive.  
 Second, while Edwards knew that J.S. was staying at Journey 
Home, and Edwards had dealt with Journey Home in the past, the record 
suggests that Edwards did not do any further investigation, or discuss 
J.S.’s continuing stay at Journey Home with any of the Journey Home 
staff.120 Although Edwards’ time was limited by the statute, she could have 
“freely and liberally’ requested a continuance, but she did not.121 Again, 
this illustrates the policy problem of balancing effectiveness against 
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expediency. Nonetheless, this factor weighs against the State.  
 Third, the record is somewhat unclear as to when Edwards initially 
met with J.S.. Edwards was present at the psychological examination, as 
required, but there is nothing to indicate whether she met with J.S. to 
discuss J.S.’s specific goals and the procedure of the hearing before or 
after that examination. Furthermore, because the general presumption in 
an involuntary commitment proceeding is that the person being committed 
does not want to be committed, it is likely that Edwards operated under 
that presumption, regardless of when and how her initial meeting with J.S. 
took place. This factor could turn in the State’s favor if the record is not 
decisive.  
 Fourth, regarding J.S.’s right to remain silent, Edwards did object, 
but it was not contemporaneous.122 However, her objection was overruled, 
and the Court in K.G.F. noted that a missed objection is relatively 
unimportant in comparison to the other factors.123 This factor therefore has 
little effect on the Court’s analysis.  
 Finally, when evaluating Edwards in her role as advocate and 
adversary, the Court will likely find that Edwards satisfied this role 
because she advocated either for the petition to be dismissed, or for J.S. to 
be committed to a community placement before she knew Journey Home 
was not an option. Simply because Edwards did not attain J.S.’s desired 
result is not grounds for inadequacy. Thus, if the Court applies K.G.F. as 
it stands, the Court will likely find that Edwards was not ineffective 
counsel. Additionally, if the Court were to apply the current K.G.F. test 
and find Edwards was not ineffective, that would underscore the fact that 
although K.G.F. is a stricter standard, it is still difficult to show that 
counsel was ineffective; essentially, an application of the current five-part 
test is really a consideration of the principles in Strickland’s test, which 
again emphasizes the need for a revised or entirely new test. 
 However, if the Court does find that Edwards ineffectively 
represented J.S., the Court will be issuing a statement that patient-
respondents in involuntary commitment proceedings require greater due 
process protections than those appointed counsel in criminal proceedings. 
Such a ruling would create even greater strain between the standards of 
K.G.F. and the time limits imposed by the statutes governing the treatment 
of the severely mentally ill. Ultimately, if the Court does not revise its 
interpretation of K.G.F. or articulate a new standard, and it finds Edwards 
did ineffectively represent J.S., appointed counsel in involuntary 
commitment proceedings could face a nearly impossible task when 
attempting to satisfy due process requirements.  
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